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THE PRESENT RELIGIOUS REVOLUTION.

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THE spirit of a neo-protestantism has finally dawned upon the world. Society is consequently passing through an intellectual revolution. The human mind everywhere is in a ferment. Old forms of thought and doctrine are decaying in the midst of new-born truth. Conceptions of life and duty consistent with knowledge and reason are superseding the old notions. Much is being destroyed, but more is being built. While the old creeds are being abandoned loftier and more rational views of conduct are being developed. The period is both destructive and constructive. It has formative and established as well as transitional and developing features. While the process upheaves, it shapes, while it floats it anchors the intellectual life. While it changes the state of morals and annihilates the basis of the old untenable system of theology it carries the mind into safe, permanent, and fundamental motives for action.

The first protestantism beginning chiefly with Luther but extending back into the years of the fifteenth century awoke the world into such a new life that it changed the character of western civilisation, giving a fresh spirit and devotion to the Renaissance and creating the era in history known as the Reformation. The new protestantism while it promises as much to society as the first, differs from it in the scope and nature of its aims. The former was a revolt from the tyrannical and degrading spirit of the Roman hierarchy, the latter is a demand for the largest possible intellectual freedom. The one exalted the Bible as the infallible and immaculate word of God, the other, with no reverence for traditions as permanent guides to conduct, but with a love for truth wherever it may be found, looks to the law of being as the basis, authority, and source of all morality and religion. The old protestantism was purely intellectual in its aims; the new is dominated by the politico-economical and social question.

The subject will be here treated in three parts. First, an inquiry will be made as to the theological aspect of the revolution—for what is the battle at present being waged and where will the argument inevitably carry the mind? In the second place the question will be asked: Is there any real authority for morals and if so what will the ethical outcome of the

present revolution be? The third part will be comprehended by the discussion of the position society should maintain to practical ethical reform movements in deference to organisations which chiefly if not altogether exist for the furtherance of theological ideas or denominational propagandism.

The present revolution which has already begun to show dynamic results is superficially styled, *theological*. It is this to be sure but it is more than this. It displays itself in theology and while it reaches far and wide, making the pulpits throughout Christendom tremble, yet its occult influence like fire is radical and while it burns away the old barriers which have offered a refuge and retreat to the fearful, it inspires with a new spirit and transports into a new world of environment and responsibility, the thousands who have felt that existence would be unendurable without the old beliefs. From the time Christianity passed through its first serious transformation, when the traditional and genuine utterances of Jesus were by the council of Nicea put into theological form up to the present period of its history the authority of the Bible was denied only by the free-thinker and extremist. Internal dissensions were neither atheistic nor ethical, but schismatic and doctrinal. Gradually, however, the power of criticism among the liberals began to effect the intellectual life of the church, and it remained for the nineteenth century to cast upon the world even from the church skeptical and faithless followers. First one doctrine and then another came into dispute, and although council after council was called to consider every new heresy, yet neither the belief in the Bible as the repository of the revelation of God to man or in Christianity as an alleged supernatural religion, was disturbed. The first serious storm broke over the church when Arius in the year 521 A. D., at the council of Alexandria was deposed from the ministry. The fire kindled by Arius was kept alive by such men as Servetus and Socinus, but heresies of all sorts were as quickly suppressed as created and the church cycled through the centuries still intent upon maintaining the Bible as the immaculate word of God and still glad of any triumph gained by extolling the Christian mythus. Matters drifted, but not in the direction which the church had signalled or preferred. As the spirit of denominationalism spread and became more

pronounced, ultra reform parties sprung up in the midst of the church and dogmas once regarded as an essential part of the Christian religion—indeed as an integral unit of the universal process of salvation, involving nearly every creed of Christendom, were seriously questioned if not silently repudiated. The discussion is still on in all religious sects and although its unimportance is being minimised by some, yet it is forcing the Christian apologist into a new and dangerous field for controversy and battle. The contra argument to many is irresistible and there is, they think, but one inevitable conclusion. It is this, that the Bible is neither the repository of the revelation or the infallible word of God, but that it is a record of the literary social and religious history of the Jewish race. With this view I thoroughly concur. The real question, therefore, the one which rises above every other one in importance is not whether the doctrine of the old genesis as displayed and elaborated in Calvinism or particularly in the old theology is true or whether any special dogma of theology is false, but it is this whether the Bible is what the radicals declare it to be, and if so whether the *vertebræ*—in fact whether the entire structure of theology which is built upon the Bible as the infallible word of God, does not fall to the ground. Neo-protestantism means this if it means anything, and the challenge has gone forth to the entire Christian church to cease waging war over creed and come boldly forth either in favor of or against the true and rational view of the Bible. The position of the Presbyterian church is rendered necessarily ambiguous and hypocritical by her own conduct,—especially regarding Rev. Dr. Briggs of the Union Theological Seminary—as is that of the Episcopal church respecting the heresy of the Rev. Dr. Heber Newton. What is to be done? one of two things! The church is either to struggle on, pursuing an inexplicable and ambiguous course, burdened by a theology which is irrational and which has lost its hold on society, until she decays ignominiously, or she is to drop her nominal appellation, her theology, her spirit of denominational propagandism, and become as she ought and will an organisation for humanitarian and ethical work. These may seem to many to be fearful alternatives—yet they are the only alternatives now open to the church. It is no longer a matter of doubt that the church as organised is fast losing its power as the custodian of human rights. Nay more than this, the church is no longer the oracle of universal truth, nor is it any longer regarded as the savior of humanity. It is a deplorable fact, which is to-day obtruding itself upon the attention everywhere, indeed, a fact admitted by all those conversant with the facts, that the average non-church attendants and members represent nearly if not more than eighty per cent. of the entire popula-

tion of the United States. It would be impossible to tell all the various causes which tend to produce this state of things, but it is patent to all that the masses of the people, not excepting much of the class element, have lost a working interest in the Christian church. As much as the church may be condemned for its creed, its bravado, its partial and sectarian work, the estranged classes have in a measure played a dangerous part. They have cut themselves loose from that which has proven to be one of the most powerful factors in society, if not ameliorating and aggressive, at least restraining in its nature. True, there seemed to be no other alternative, for with the many the question was not one of heartless indifference, but one of conscience. The disaffected and the estranged classes grew up not as the representation of a day's revolt. They were the slow gathering aggregation of all who thought that greater results could be attained by going out of rather than by remaining in the church. They were as the fearless Brutus who "set honor in one eye and death in the other" rather than prove false to an ideal or to the highest perception of truth. In this although they were honest and honorable they yet dealt unconsciously a terrible blow at the church, for no institution, organised for the good of mankind can afford to be divorced from and free of the power and usefulness of those who maintain a love for freedom, reason, and truth. All this leads to the assertion that the age has outgrown not only the use of the Bible as a fetish and as an infallible, intellectual guide to conduct, but that it is really neither disposed to put new wine into old bottles, rehabilitate in fashionable and modernised intellectual dress the ghost of the old theology, nor to pervert and distort the creed of Christianity to meet the exigencies of man's present life. To reconstruct Christianity upon a basis of pure reason is to explain Christianity away. It is the folly of modern religious enthusiasts to so distort and differentiate the doctrines of Christianity that they will conform to certain preconceived ideas. Indeed, it is this folly which is accountable for the establishment of creed-anity and denominationalism, which in this century has grown into a spirit most fatal to unity of aim and work among the churches, and which has grown so complex as to cause some to wonder not only as one of the persons in Longfellow's *Hyperion* did—whether Jesus was a Catholic or a Protestant, but whether he was not a Methodist, Presbyterian, Unitarian, or what not. All this medley of beliefs has been devised to please the man with one idea or to help to satisfy the vanity of those who seek after conformity, or who in many respects do not know what they wish. Daniel Webster tells the story that the three most troublesome clients he ever had were a young lady who wanted to be married, a married woman who wanted a divorce,

and an old maid who did not know what she wanted. The fact is that the church is literally besieged with the class who like the old maid really do not know what they want. They neither wish to see unity, diversity, nor conformity in the church. They claim to be willing to be guided by truth and yet they are like the man who said that he was open to conviction but he would like to see the man who could convince him. They are indeed the Judases who are betraying the church to her enemies, they are the ones who while they carry the cross they press the heaviest upon him who bears it. They oppose all aggressive ideas—they condemn all innovations—they declare themselves against all radicalism.

Now the question may be asked, granted that the Bible is literature, and that theology as taught by the church is false to reason and nature, and that Christianity is no longer adapted to the needs of the present generation or future generations, How is Jesus to be disposed of? It is admitted that he is no longer to be regarded as a God. It is remarkable how and what man has thought of him. Kant thought him to be the ideal of human perfection while John Stuart Mill regarded him as a very extraordinary man. Gerald Massey considered him to be a fiction while Renan judged him to be an effeminate idealist. All of these critics seemed to have based their opinion upon the available history of his life and teaching. There is every reason for believing that Jesus will take a place among the reformers of the world and that such of his teaching as accords with reason and meets the needs of mankind will be exalted into evidence of the utility and authority for the practise of morals. That this is really the place he deserves in history is no longer a question of doubt. It is to be regretted that it took nearly 1900 years to strip him of the divinity with which an idolatrous and an affectionate Christendom had generously invested him. When Jesus as "ecce deus" becomes "ecce homo" his character is none the less beautiful and inspiring, his teaching none the less real and severe, his conduct none the less exemplary and exalting. Indeed, he becomes when divested of all supernaturalism a magnificent illustration, either as a real or an ideal character of the incarnation of the principles of spirituality. His work was altogether humanitarian. His teaching was, so far as history goes, a conglomerate of the mythical and mystical notions of the day rationalised by his own knowledge. His doctrines cannot become the measuring line of science as also he as a man cannot become the permanent, the sole and infallible social guide of humanity. As a man all of his conduct and teaching must pass through the continuing refining processes of thought—indeed they must stand the test of what might here be conveniently called the law of permanent

utility, before the human mind can stamp them as infallible truth—before it can say as it says of mathematics, here are either self-evident axioms and propositions which can be demonstrated or proven. Thus is the life of Jesus as that of every other reformer or teacher when reduced to experience to be rejected or utilised for the good of mankind. Thus does Christianity as all the other ethnic religions pass into and become a part of the stream of knowledge which grows apace with the growing mind of man.

Such a position will be objected to first on the ground that it makes Christianity either an illustration of natural religion or morality and thus strips it of its miracle or its supernatural feature, and second that it is an impractical if not a dangerous expedient. The fact is it neither robs Christianity of the miracle nor reduces it to a morality. It challenges the rationality of its claim. When the Christian apologist declares that Christianity is the only revealed religion of God to man because it is contained in the Bible, thus alleging the Bible to be authority unquestioned and affirms that it is a miracle or nothing the critic is forced to ask the reasons for the statement. As wise and comprehensive a scholarship as may be found, including in a list of names many of the ablest men the world has produced, endorses the view that Christian evidences need to be retestified before all the data which they give regarding the genuineness and authenticity of the gospels can be accepted as history of the life and teaching of Jesus—and further, that so far as it is able to decide Christianity as a mythus and Christianity as a morality may be the exegetical deductions of parties interested in the vindication of their particular ideas. The question should not be, Can Christianity be so rationalised as to conform to the growing intelligence of mankind? but, Is it what it purports to be or what theologians declare it is, and as such is it of universal and perpetual value to man? Says the critic: If it is not the product of that which is involved in the uniformity of the laws of natural causation and inseparably bound up with the world's life, it must stand forth as inexplicable in consciousness. This position of the rationalist is fastening itself upon the world's thought and life and bids fair to overthrow and revolutionise the Christian church. The controversy is not merely theological but it is scientific and for practical results. Herein arises then the question regarding the impracticability and danger of the expedient. For my own part I believe that the downfall of the Christian church as the advocate of a supernatural religion is not only possible but it is imminent if not now and here at hand. Nor can the fall be prevented any more than the fall of a bird that is suddenly shot through the heart can be prevented. Destroy the vitalising organ of the church—its belief in the Christian myth-

ology—and whatever it may do for humanity along the line of morals (which work, by the way, it has always regarded as only secondary to converting a man to its creed, and giving him a title to an imaginary heaven) and its usefulness and power is at an end. What danger can come to man by casting out of his life a false creed or a pernicious idea of living? What harm or what matters it indeed if, in order to convert the world to an intellectual cult consistent with knowledge and its best life, the attempt will be made to tear down from its throne the god of stone and brass and desolate temples where the voice of truth is hushed and where knowledge is poisoned at the fountain. A writer in *The Open Court* touching upon the need of fostering the new life said that in considering the cost of reform he had not forgotten the fact that civilisation can build itself up again and that we cannot afford to slight and destroy that spiritual germ which is so indispensable to the life of mankind. "It will be worth our while," he declares, "to have our civilisation ruined fifty times over for the sake of planting the new life among the nations." There is little need however of alarm or of looking into a clear and bright sky for a storm. Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof. The beautiful feature of the present revolution is that it is going on silently and daily and the new life like Venus in the midst of the troubled sea is arising into form and beauty and is coming like an angel to place a better civilisation at our doors.

[TO BE CONCLUDED.]

IS GOD A MIND?

WE read in the first chapter of Genesis :

"And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness : and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth.

"So God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him."

These verses are significant. They have a scientific meaning. To us who define God as that power which has produced man such as he is, that is as the thinking being that aspires to ever higher and nobler ideals, the view that man is created in the image of God becomes self-evident and almost tautological. But primitive thinkers starting from the supposition that man is a likeness of God were led to the strange error that God in his turn must be a likeness of man. Thus arose all the anthropomorphic conceptions of God.

That power which produced man—let us at present call it "nature" so as to avoid the old confusion of anthropomorphism—cannot have been matter and nothing but matter, it cannot have been force or energy and nothing but force, it cannot have been sentience or the conditions of sentience, and nothing but poten-

tial sentience. Nor can it have been form or a formative principle alone. It cannot have been law and order only. It must have been all this together. Matter, force, sentience, form, law, and order are only aspects of nature, they are only abstract ideas representing some qualities of reality, which alone is the One and All. And this One and All is not a meaningless chaos, as it represents itself in minds that are confounded, but an orderly and living whole bringing forth out of itself sentient beings in whom its existence is mirrored. Existence mirrored in minds is not a mere *Fata Morgana*, a beautiful mirage, but it serves the practical purpose of guidance, to let the children of nature live in accord with its great mother, to show them the way of salvation, the gate that leadeth unto life.

When we speak of nature we think as a rule of certain single phenomena only of this One and All ; we think of mountains and trees but not so much of man's mind and his interferences with the rest of nature—for properly considered man's mind is a part of nature. When we speak of reality, we think above all of its actuality, its efficacy, its immediate presence, but when we speak of God, we think of it as an authoritative existence, as our standard of ethics, as the moral law, allegorically represented as our Father, that is, as the power that created us and guides us still, to which we have to conform in our ethical aspirations. Nature, Reality, God, or whatever other expression we may have for the One and All of the great Cosmos in its infinite manifestations and in its eternal being, are all names only, abstract ideas representing now this and now that quality of one and the same existence.

Sentient creatures, the children of God, in so far as they are psychical are called minds. And we ask, What do we understand by minds?

A mind, in brief, is a description of the world in ideas. "Ideas" means literally "images." The different things are represented, and the interaction among these representations is called thinking.

How ideas originate is a question the solution of which can only be hinted at in this connection. Mind can originate only in feeling beings. The feelings of feeling beings are different according to the different sense-impressions through and with which they make their appearance, similar sense-impressions being associated with similar feelings. Thus feelings acquire meaning. The various causes of the different sense-impressions are symbolised in various feelings as well as in the memory pictures of these various feelings. Ideas again are symbols representing whole groups of such feelings as are somehow constantly associated. And the glorious evolution of the realm of ideas in living beings is easily explained if we consider its usefulness as a means of information concerning the surrounding world. They afford the possibility of orientation and

serve as a guidance for action. With the assistance of representative images plans of action become possible, and a conception of a better arrangement of this or that state of things—generally called an ideal—is of the highest importance to the further development of life and mind. A growth of mind leads to an increase of power. Each acquirement of truth means an expanse of the dominion of mind in nature.

Minds naturally grow by degrees; they start with simple feelings in irritable substance, and in the long run of millenniums through a preservation of soul-structures (generally called hereditary transmission) and, in the higher grades of life, through a direct transference of mind by means of education they gather a rich store of soul-structures, of pictures representing innumerable objects as well as the subtle relations among these objects.

Let us now ask whether God can be a mind. Our answer is decidedly negative. Every mind is a world of representations, of pictures, of ideas; and these ideas, pictures, and representations have a meaning. If they are true they represent realities. Now if there is a God, and we say that there is, God is not ideality but reality; he is not a mental representation of the actual world, of nature, of the Universe, of the Cosmos; he is much more than a mere representation, he is the actual world, nature, the Universe, the Cosmos itself. He is the One and All, not a part of it, or a mere picture of it. God is also the picture, and he is that quality of the world which makes the picturing in minds possible. God is in the mind, he reveals himself in the human soul; he appears in Truth. But God is not only the truth; he is infinitely more than the truth, he is the reality represented in the truth.

Truth is truth because it is an image shaped unto the likeness of the original. The human mind is created as an image of God. Now the theologian comes and says, Man is like God, man is mind—i. e., a world of images or ideas—therefore God must be a mind. Is this not like saying, This is a picture of George Washington, it is like George Washington. Therefore George Washington is a picture! No! George Washington is more than a picture; he is the original of the picture!

It is often said that man is a finite mind and God is an infinite mind. But what has either infinitude or finiteness to do with mind? Mind, every mind, is infinite in its possibilities, there is no limit to its growth, there is no boundary which it cannot reach and transcend. But at any special state, as at present or at any moment in the future, mind is and always will be something definite. Consider that all mental representations are possible only through limitation. Thus vision is possible only through focusing the eyes upon

one spot. Comprehension in mental pictures, is a focusing of the mind's attention upon one thing or one feature of things. Accordingly minds in this sense are always finite, always limited. Every mind is always the mind of a concrete being and the contents of every mind are also of a concrete kind. Think of infinite pictures, or infinite ideas! What a meaningless combination of words! If God, the One and All, is infinite indeed, he certainly cannot be a mind.

We might and some people indeed do understand by mind the nature of mind, mentality. The nature of mind may be found in sentience or in that quality of nature which produces sentience—we call it potential sentience. Or it may be found in the order prevailing among the mental representations, which order is representative of the objective world-order, of the cosmic law and the rationality of the universe as represented in cosmic laws. Very well. If "mind" means the nature of mind, then certainly God is mind, but he is not *a* mind.

If God were a mind, it were necessary for him to have ideas. Otherwise his mind would represent without representations and symbolise without symbols. He would have to think his ideas consecutively as we do and form different associations at a time. Yet, what would mental representations avail him? He need not think, he need not speak to himself in order to make up his mind to act in this or that way. He simply acts. He in his all-sufficiency is always himself and thus he is consistent with himself.

In the catechism this truth is mythologically expressed in the idea of omniscience. Nature, as it were, obeys the law everywhere. The falling stone falls as if it knew the law of gravitation and had correctly computed the present case. Nature need not know the law in order to obey it. She need not employ the symbols of mental representation to remain consistent with herself. She is herself everywhere, and the laws of nature are a part and feature of nature. We say, Nature is as it were omniscient. Actually nature is more than omniscient. As omniscient, she might communicate information about all things of herself to herself. This communication, however, is so direct, she being herself everywhere, that it means, i. e. the symbols, which are the crutches of communication, disappear into zero. The communication is received before it is pronounced.

That God should be the One and All, and at the same time a mind, would be something like saying, that a man in order to be a man and himself, should always have his passport or his picture in his pocket. No! If we speak of the man, we mean the man and not his picture. If we speak of God, we mean the All-Being and not a mind, we mean the original and not the copy, we mean the creator and not the creature.

Is it Atheism to deny that God is a mind? If you understand by God that he is a person like ourselves, it certainly is Atheism. But if the conception of God as a mind and a person were the only allowable God-idea, then theism would be paganism. What is paganism but the personification of parts of nature or nature as a whole and the acting accordingly. Pagans try to bend the course of nature and natural laws not by their own efforts and honest work, but by prayers and sacrifices—as if God or the Gods were human beings like ourselves influenced by flatteries and bribable by gifts! Christ has done away with the vain repetitions as do the heathens, but the Christians still cling to Pagan customs, pagan rites and a pagan conception of God.

People who have given little thought to the subject might think, that if God is not a mind, it is as good as if he did not exist. Then he would only be brute force and crude matter. But this is a mistaken conception of God. The materialist runs to the other extreme. God is not mere force and God is not crude matter. How grand and divine this wonderful All-Being is, can only be learned from its manifestations. The heavens declare the glory of God and the firmament showeth his handiwork. Day unto day uttereth speech and night unto night showeth knowledge. There is no speech nor language where their voice is not heard. Yet grander than all the starry heavens in their glorious concert is the soul of man, the mind that yearns for truth, the spirit that understands, and aspires to achieve, the work of truth.

The All, the Cosmos, God, or by whatever name we may call the great whole of which we are parts and phenomena, is not a heap of material atoms nor a chaos of blind forces. The most characteristic feature of his being is order and law. And this order and law is called in the New Testament Logos—i. e. rationality, reason, logical consistency. God would be no God without the logos. This Logos is a constitutional part of God. God is not a mind, but he is mind, he is logos, and he appears in mind. God is not truth, but he appears in truth. This is the revelation which Christianity has brought into the world.

Says St. John: "In the beginning, [that means from eternity] was the Logos and the Logos was with God and the Logos was God. All things were made by him and without him was not anything made that was made. . . . And the Logos was made flesh."

This last sentence is the kernel of Christianity. The divinity of the world appears in humanity, and true humanity embodies all that which we call divine. The son of man is the child of God and the ideal of humanity is the God-man. God is not a mind, but nevertheless God is mind, and when we come to ask, where is the Father, Christ answers very positively and unmistakably "I and the Father are one."

Those who believe in God as being a mind are more pagan than they are aware of. It may be said that God is mind, but not a mind. Suppose he were a mind, is that not actually polytheism only with the number of Gods reduced to the singular? Christ does not say, God is a spirit, but "God is spirit." Yet the pagan conception of God has been so influential that the translator has inserted that little word which changes a most radical, a philosophical and a monistic idea into the very same superstitions against which Christ had protested so vigorously.

Science is not dangerous to religion, and clear thought is not against the teachings of Christ. Science is dangerous to superstitions and clear thought is incompatible with many dogmas and conceptions which are upheld at present by the Christian churches. The dogmatist rightly shuns the light of science, but the religious man, that is, he who wants truth unadulterated and is ready to conform to truth, to live it and to act according to his best knowledge of truth, he will not lose his religion but purify it through thought and scientific exactness of thought.

Says Lord Bacon:

"A little philosophy inclineth Man's mind to atheism, but depth in philosophy bringeth men's minds about to religion."

Bacon's view of God is not clear and thus this famous saying of his also lacks lucidity. We understand it and quote it in the sense, that a little philosophy is sufficient to make apparent the contradictions and absurdities contained in the traditional idea of God. But a deeper insight will reveal the profound truth that is contained therein. Depth in philosophy will help us to purify the fundamental conceptions of religious thought, above all the idea of God. When we maintain that God is not a mind, we do not deny that he is mind, taking mind in the sense of the Greek "logos"; and at any rate he is greater than the greatest human or other mind can be, for he is the reality itself of which a mind is only an image, a symbol, and a representation.

CURRENT TOPICS.

HAS a man a right to make a discord in music and thus give pain to persons of rhythmical nerves and classic taste? May the owner of a fiddle provoke it in the hearing of others? I admit that if I ask him for a tune, I am bound in courtesy to listen to his torture of the strings, and even to say falsely that the torture pleases me; but suppose he thrust his notes upon me, or suppose I buy them, may I not insist that they be true, and have I not a right to complain if they be false and counterfeit? And one question more, if a man may not break "the concord of sweet sounds" in music, has he a right to make discords in rhetoric? I maintain that these offenses are very much alike. I grant you there are people of coarse fibre to whom the question is of no concern, but there are also men and women whose nerves are finely strung in sympathy with all the tunes and cadences of pure and classic language. They are as loyal to their native tongue as to their na-

tive land. To them the limpid flow of our literature from Chaucer to Longfellow is an eloquent melody, whose notes may not be rudely jarred, nor its symphonies destroyed. To them false grammar is like any other falsehood, the sign of an uncultivated soul. To them a barbarism in verse or prose is barbarism in conduct. A solecism in speech gives them actual pain, so finely are their sensibilities attuned to all the harmonies of words. They like words too that are honest and void of all duplicity. Rocked in a cradle, and not in a "layette," they want to be buried not in a "casket" but in a coffin. They do not say, "My heart is in the casket there with Cæsar"; nor "Stand back my lord, and let the casket pass." This plaintive overture was caused by a grievance which I will now bring into court for judgment.

* * *

I have the honor to belong to a military society, and an invitation from the commander to assist in unveiling the Grant statue offers this inducement, "In addition to the Nation's Chief Executive, other dignitaries of rank will be present and participate in the ceremonies of the day." This is well meant, but what I object to is the insipid attenuation "Chief Executive," by which the President of the United States is habitually diluted in his own country. We might as well call him the Chief Adjective. There is something masculine, dignified, and personal, in the high sounding civic title "President of the United States," while there is a tin-whistle squeak in the explanatory, abstract, and impersonal subterfuge, "Chief Executive"; which, by the way, is an official name not known to the American constitution. Substitute for the inferior sentence this, "in addition to the President of the United States, other dignitaries of rank will be present," and how strong and stately it looks and sounds in comparison with its former equivocal and meagre form. I have just read that in a recent hunting expedition "The Chief Executive shot thirty-two ducks." In speaking of the President why should we conceal his official title behind pedantic jargon only half descriptive of his prerogative and duties? That executive power is vested in the President is merely one quality of his office. He has also the pardoning power, the veto power, the treaty making power, the appointing power, and he is also Commander in chief of the army and the navy. All his official prerogatives and duties, and also his personal rank are expressed in the title "President of the United States." In the illegitimate phrase "Chief Executive" there is hardly any meaning at all. "Commander in chief of the army" would have been more fitting for a military occasion than "Chief Executive," but "President of the United States" is best of all, because it is the most respectful and the most comprehensive; it needs no explanation, and besides, it is the title conferred upon the chief magistrate by the constitution.

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I have received through the office of *The Open Court*, a letter from Mr. F. de Gissac, enclosing a newspaper article headed, "How Europe Beats Us," wherein it is asserted that European labor is more skillful and intelligent than American labor, and that the superiority "is the result of careful training in technical schools where the art of designing and finishing are taught by the best authorities." Mr. de Gissac does me the honor to submit this article to me, "as evidencing the necessity for a National provision for the artistic education and refinement of the people." The evidence he refers to is taken from the school statistics of Holland, Belgium, Denmark, Sweden, Italy, and Switzerland, where technical schools are provided for giving "a scientific and artistic knowledge corresponding to the profession of those who frequent them." It appears that Belgium has founded thirty-six industrial schools; Holland thirty-two industrial, and twenty-five professional schools; Switzerland eighty-seven schools giving to apprentices and workmen professional instruction; and that's "how Europe beats us." The premises do not sustain the conclusion,

nor can it be allowed that the mechanics of Europe as a class excel the Americans in skill, intelligence, and scientific and artistic knowledge. No doubt that in some special branches of the mechanic arts the Frenchman is more skillful than the American, as the German is in other branches, the Italian in others, and even the Turk in some; but taking all the industrial occupations together, the Americans cannot be excelled by any other people in artistic design and finish, nor in quickness of hand and eye. Therefore, before proceeding to show the reason why a fish thrown into a pail of water adds nothing to the weight of the pail and its contents, we had better find out whether the assertion itself is true. It is very likely true that in the matter of industrial schools, the European nations are ahead of us, and that it will take us a long time to catch up to them, because our national conceit is so continental and so vast, as becomes a people with such a large country, that we do not like to put ourselves under obligations to foreigners for any instruction or examples; like some Englishmen I was once with in a shipwreck, who preferred to go down with the ship rather than be saved in a lifeboat commanded by the second mate, because he was a dutchman from Rotterdam.

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It is due largely to our jealousy of Government that we have no National or State schools of art and industry. The dividing line between "Public" and "Private" has not yet been drawn across the field of education. The limit of State power is in dispute. A strong sentiment prevails that the state has no right to raise lawyers, doctors, painters, and sculptors, any more than it has to raise melons and cabbages; and few of our statesmen are brave enough to vote for public schools of instruction in the mechanic arts while "organised labor" denies to boys the freedom to learn a trade. In France, the principle of State socialism has been adopted into the theory of education, and it has been carried courageously, if not wisely, into practice, even to the extent of teaching trades; and further than that, even to the extent of giving free dinners and decent clothes to the poorer children who otherwise might not be able to go to school. It is worthy of note that the free dinner question is being agitated in England, and candidates for parliament find themselves embarrassed when called upon to declare themselves either for free dinners or against them. So, in the development of the fine arts, the French government is extremely liberal, and France has paid a great deal of money for the encouragement of painting, sculpture, music, and the drama. After all, it is not by any means proved that the esthetic taste of the French people is due to the patronage given to the fine arts by the government. Probably much of it is due to the influence of natural scenery on the character of a people; a spiritual influence, hereditary from generation to generation for a thousand years; to the picturesque and poetic scenery, exuberant in the sun; or as Macaulay has it, to "thy corn fields green and sunny vines, Oh, pleasant land of France."

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In the Reports from the Consuls of the United States, for the month of July, 1891, is one from Francis B. Loomis, consul at St. Etienne, France, on the subject of "National aid to art." From this it appears that M. Fédère, attached to the Luxembourg museum, was recently sent by the French Minister of Public Instruction to make a careful study of the question of Government aid to art in Great Britain. In his report M. Fédère says, "The French system, established immediately after the revolution, possesses a homogeneity and freedom vainly sought for in England, where the fine arts are subjected to the restrictions of certain traditions, some of which are obsolete, being indeed of mediæval origin. Furthermore, whereas in France the State claims all the institutions, the English government abandons willingly everything that might be left to private enterprise. Consequently, there exists in England no minister of the fine arts, nor a minister of pub

lic instruction properly so-called." This explanation will apply to the United States, as well as to Great Britain. The development of the fine arts is left to private enterprise. This is not entirely true in either country, but it is true enough to be asserted as a rule. And whether art flourishes more under public patronage than under private enterprise, is yet an open question. Further, speaking of the attitude of Great Britain towards a school of the fine arts, M. Fédirc says, "The State, except in the case of primary artistic education, leaves to private initiative the care of forming painters, sculptors and musicians, and the only school is that of the Royal Academy, which is a private society. . . . England gives facility to the art student to acquire the first notions of the subject, multiplies the models in the museums destined to form his tastes, but proceeds no further. The artist is obliged to shift for himself without the hope of receiving any decoration or pecuniary encouragement, which is the reverse of the system which obtains in France." It may be painfully strained sometimes, but after all, the "shift for himself" policy lies at the foundation of England's greatness, and that of her colonies in America. It also stimulates the sentiment of liberty. M. M. TRUMBULL.

CORRESPONDENCE.

MATERIALISM VERSUS SPIRITUALISM.

To the Editor of The Open Court:

KINDLY permit me, when convenient to supplement my letter of 6th August on Prof. Max Müller's philological interpretation of physiological results, by the following very brief minute. My position is nothing else—call it Hylo-zoism or Hylo-idealism as you choose—than the present established standpoint of physical and moral science; militating as it does, against any possible *éirenon* between Science—of which Philosophy is only a form, viz. the Science of general principles—and Religion as utterly impossible. If I may be allowed to say so in a journal devoted to their "Conciliation," Religion is based on Animism, on the synergy of Matter and "Spirit" a quite unthinkable supposition, for how can two such Incompatibles interact and synergise? Science, true knowledge, including Philosophy, or *Weltweisheit*, on Hyilism or Materialism, of which the somatic brain is the workshop and instrument (*Werkzeug*), and hence centre, radius, and periphery, alike of self and not self, but of that ring fence mortal thought is quite impotent to escape. All empiric science is a mere case of experimentalising on states of *our own* Consciousness, a fact which quite excludes aught but Anthropo-, and in the last analysis, *Auto*-morphism from the field of human vision, unifying thus percept and concept, an idea so repugnant to Lord Bacon, who ridiculed men for spinning, like spiders, webs out of their own entrails, a procedure which is to them a case of Hobson's choice. And, though Bacon was not of their tribe, all special scientists, as such, and just because they are specialists, follow his lead, it being with them a necessity to postulate two factors in Life and Mind, a thing perceived and a percipient perceiver. This dualism has been "justified" by the analogy of a musical instrument and musician. But on reflection this correspondence is realised as quite a fallacy, the human organism (I take no notice of the mere sentient animal or brute) resembling an *automatic* instrument, like a musical snuff box, which acts, when wound up, by virtue of its own indwelling properties or constitution. So that human thought and objects of thought are identical, and necessarily a mere *Autopsy* or *Self*-inspection. Out of the region of the Ego, defining it as the sum total, or *ensemble*, of the organic functions into that of the Non-Ego, human wits never can pass. *Unser Latein* (as the German proverb, equivalent to being at our wit's end has it) *ist da zu Ende*. And what rational being will care to set rationalism at defiance by groping, like a blind Polyphemus, among objects, which in the nature of things, i. e. of himself, are quite alien and taboo as

supra nos and therefore on which Reason sets her interdict. Alienism, concrete and practical or abstract—synonymous in modern medicine alike with Lunar—is thus quite an illusion, all being Subject, Self-Objectivism being thus only the projection of the all-containing Ego into a seemingly separate state of the Non-Ego. So that though Aocosmism does not follow, but the reverse, the Macrocosm is immersed in the Microcosm, which latter, so far as we ever can be judges, is, what God has been taken to be, Creator and Creation, Demiurge and Demiurgy combined, a state of matters, utterly, and for ever fatal, to all Dualism whatsoever. Strict Egoistic Monism is thus the sole charter of our being. We gain *immensely* and lose nothing, by this change of front. Absolute immortality becomes, of course, a mere *Hirngespinnst*, in the vulgar sense, all "things" being, in the esoteric one, such. But as we have, in every pulse-beat this sense of eternity and immortality, we may still claim for ourselves the virtual reality of æonial existence, while in our present bodies and world. We never can be "launched into eternity," as we never are elsewhere. Every true abstract thinker has this habitual sense of endlessness at all times and seasons. The vulgar realist and *bête humaine* has it in epochs of pain and anguish, suspense and anxious fear. As Byron well puts it in his "Island," describing the tragedy of the mutiny of the Bounty. Speaking of the crucial crisis in the doom of the mutineers that great revolutionary poet writes: "Moments like to these rend men's lives into immortalities" (eternities). So that we are immortal and eternal, I repeat, even while alive, and indeed only while alive. God, therefore, as "Spirit" drops, as the dying Valentine says to Gretchen in Faust, *Aus dem Spiel*. He, if he be a He, is left entirely out of the human comedy altogether. He is a superfluity and therefore a paralogism if our Titan-Self is his surrogate and substitute. So that we may rest secure in the belief that the Brain of man, and ultimately of the Self, is all that Deity now replaced by Egoity has been provisionally credited with being. We need him not, if *autochthones*. For, if so, originally Life springs from Not-Life. We are therefore quite in our proper place in this world ever in a state of Becoming. It bore us. Organic and In-organic are identical. No doubt "Nature" is *neveral* as well as maternal. But "her" cruelty and torture chambers are to be conquered in no other way than by *Self*-exertion. As indicated in the fable of Hercules and the Wagoner. R. LEWINS, M. D.

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